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Abstract 
There is a strong push to change from manned toward both unmanned and 
optionally manned systems within the Department of Defense. There are significant open 
questions about how the manned versus unmanned versus optionally manned options 
influence costs, adaptability, operational utility, and suitability for missions. The Institute for 
Defense Analyses developed an approach to address these questions that links underlying 
physical attributes and engineering relationships to mission attributes and costs. We discuss 
this approach, where it fits into the acquisition process, and how it can be used to 
quantitatively inform the unmanned versus optionally manned discussions at both a system 
level and fleet level. 
Background 
Today’s operational environment is complicated by many requirements that compete 
against one another for design resources (Freedberg, 2019).1 Of course, this is not the 
primary challenge—after all, trade studies have been around for a long time. The primary 
challenge is characterizing the trades among system attributes (including cost) in a manner 
that can inform and guide leadership decisions prior to the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) 
stage, rather than simply defending the selected alternative after the fact. In the end, this 
requires methods that leaders understand and visualizations that they can use. These 
                                                
 
 
1 “We were under three entirely different organizations previously,” Maj. Gen. Cedric Wins 
said. So RDECOM scientists and engineers would often be eager to offer their expertise to the future 
concepts teams, but “sometimes, though, quite frankly we might be late to the game,” he said. The 
futurists might have committed to a particular technology without realizing there was a better 
alternative or, worse yet, without realizing it just wasn’t ready for the real world.  
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methods must expose the implications of choices rather than mask them, long before 
detailed designs for the alternative approaches exist.  
The Institute for Defense Analyses’ (IDA’s) trade space framework—Deducing 
Economically Realistic Implications Via Engineering (DERIVE)—links engineering and 
physics analysis, operational constraints, and semi-parametric cost estimates. The goal is to 
increase the efficiency of the acquisition process by reducing friction between the program 
office, the Services, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 
especially at program initiation and during the early stages of development. 
IDA designed the DERIVE framework to link important technical inputs to 
programmatic and operational outputs in a straightforward, traceable, and transparent 
manner. The framework provides an analytic structure that could be used to build 
understanding and communicate intent. It could be especially helpful for programs whose 
complex interactions between requirements, operational restrictions, and technology—rather 
than any individual issue—drive acquisition outcomes. 
Trade Space 
The use of trade studies in engineering is not new. It has a long history in the 
technical community and has now been formally adopted into the Department of Defense 
(DoD) acquisition decision-making process. Recent experiences suggest that the Services’ 
trade-space tools are being used to inform their internal deliberations. However, several 
recent new-start proposals have been the subject of follow-on trade studies and amended 
AoA efforts, suggesting room for improvement. In particular, past trade studies have 
generally not been able to address high-level trades between competing design families 
(e.g., conventional helicopters vs. tilt-rotors), or affordability implications of design choices. 
Schedule delays associated with follow-on analyses can be avoided if the trade 
study processes and analytical outputs are structured to support both user and oversight 
objectives. The outputs of IDA’s DERIVE framework are constructed to achieve this goal by 
enhancing traceability and transparency of inputs, outputs, and decision-making. 
Traceability 
Traceability is used by systems engineers to manage technically complex endeavors 
by flowing down program objectives into discrete technical goals. Alternatively, students 
employ traceability to demonstrate to professors that they have a firm grasp of the nature of 
problems even if small errors are present in the analysis. Traceability can also be leveraged 
by the Services and program offices to demonstrate that they have rigorously analyzed the 
operational environment and have a firm understanding of the technical issues and 
programmatic consequences of a new program. 
The DoD asked IDA to develop and demonstrate DERIVE on a generic infantry 
fighting vehicle (IFV). The results of that effort will be used below to illustrate how DERIVE’s 
outputs are designed to foster traceability. 
Creating traceability requires exposing the objectives of the program, how they relate 
to technical assumptions, and how the various elements interact to drive results. An output 
of the DERIVE process traces the desired capabilities to the commensurate technical inputs. 
shows how key performance and programmatic attributes can be mapped to specific 
technical requirements for an IFV.  
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Table 1. Performance and Technical Traceability Matrix 
 
 
Cross-referencing the technical assumptions and desired capabilities in a single, 
compact form provides two benefits. First, it allows the program developers to articulate 
clearly the user’s goals and the technical requirements necessary to achieve those goals. 
Second, it allows the oversight community to understand the potential loss of capability if 
there are technical shortfalls during development.  
Similarly, shows how cost traceability can be achieved. Various cost categories are 
mapped to the data sources and assumptions used in generating the cost estimate. This 
traceability matrix allows oversight organizations to qualitatively assess the riskiness and 
fidelity of the estimate.  
Table 2. Cost Elements and Costing Assumptions and Data Sources 
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Finally, the logic used to estimate the costs and performance of the IFV trade space 
is described in Figure 1. In sum, the DERIVE framework helps program developers and the 
acquisition oversight community build a common understanding of the key technical, 
operational, and cost drivers of new capabilities being sought by the department. 
 
 




The DERIVE framework improves the transparency of the analyses supporting 
acquisition decisions. Figure 2 shows an output of the DERIVE framework for the IFV 
example. It enhances transparency by illustrating the entire trade space rather than a few 
point designs. Showcasing the full trade space demonstrates the thoroughness of the 
investigation and reduces the possibility of having to include additional cases. Also, instead 
of using a value function, the analysis simply highlights the desired point solutions and lists 
the rationale for the decision and the relevant trade-offs that were considered and accepted 
as part of the decision-making process. Showing trade space data, the rationale, and the 
resulting decision together serves to enhance trust, convey thoroughness, and reduce 
institutional friction. 
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Figure 2. Infantry Fighting Vehicle Trade Space with Logic for Decision 
 
The outputs from DERIVE also make certain difficult trades obvious. For example, it 
is clear from Figure 34 that no vehicle carrying six or more dismounts can provide both full 
urban trafficability and force protection level 3 or higher. If there is a mission need for well-
protected fighting vehicles in urban environments, they will need to carry fewer personnel 
per vehicle. Similarly, force protection level 5 can only be obtained using advanced armors, 
with corresponding unit cost consequences. 
Thought Experiment 1: Urban Counterinsurgency 
Given mission need for a fighting vehicle that can maneuver in 90% of urban terrain 
and provide force protection level 3 or higher, what are the available options? Figure 2 
shows that such a vehicle cannot carry very many people; the space claim of human 
passengers induces a positive feedback on required cubic feet, and thus on areal surface to 
be armored, and thus on weight. This has consequences for concepts of operations—if it is 
not possible to preserve squad integrity in urban environments while preserving force 
protection levels, either squads will need to be divided or force protection levels will need to 
be reduced. Either of these leads to changes in how the force will fight. They key is that 
exposing these issues early puts the warfighter in charge of making the decision of what 
they value, since they ultimately have to manage the consequences. 
Thought Experiment 2: Optionally Manned Vehicles 
Recent advances in remotely piloted vehicle technologies and artificial intelligence 
(AI)–enabled autonomy have increased interest in optionally manned vehicles—that is, 
vehicles that are typically operated as manned vehicles with a human driver, but can 
sometimes be operated as remotely piloted or even autonomous vehicles. What are the 
costs and benefits of optional manning? Under what circumstances would an optionally 
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manned design be preferable to an unmanned design, or to a mixed fleet of manned and 
unmanned designs? We can use DERIVE to investigate these questions. 
In general, the principal benefits of unmanned systems arise from the absence of 
those requirements related to the presence of human passengers. Human beings and their 
equipment are heavy; they occupy space; they require environmental conditioning and 
protection against threats. Unmanned systems can thus avoid the weight associated with 
humans, their equipment, additional armor, heating and air conditioning systems, air 
purification systems, doors, seats, visual displays, manual controls, and so forth. They can 
be smaller than manned systems, potentially able to operate in more confined spaces and 
with lower observability. 
Optionally manned systems do not share these benefits. Instead, they incur all of the 
weight and space penalties of manned vehicles, plus additional requirements to support 
remote operation. This might include additional sensors, communications links, and onboard 
computational power. These added systems must also be configured so as not to interfere 
with manned operations—so that, for example, any cameras that provide the “driver’s view” 
for remote operation must not interfere with the driver’s sight lines during manned 
operations. 
In the end, the business case for an optionally manned platform must rest on the mix 
of missions the system is envisioned for, and the concept of operations that would make a 
mixed fleet of manned and unmanned systems impractical. DERIVE could be used to 
quantify these trades, informing decision-makers about the operational and cost 
consequences of design choices and force mixes before committing significant resources. 
Conclusion 
DERIVE and similar approaches provide a framework that can be used to engage 
and improve acquisition outcomes. DERIVE fuses a variety of information sources 
(capabilities, operational, technical, and cost) to enable more thorough analyses in support 
of decision-making and to reduce friction between program developers and the acquisition 
oversight community. DERIVE can also serve to make fundamental trades more apparent to 
senior decision-makers, avoiding misunderstandings about what is feasible and focusing the 
discussion on the relevant warfighter values. 
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